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Odmowa potencjalnie ratującej życie transfuzji krwi przez Świadków Jehowy: czy lekarze powinni wyjaśniać, że nie wszyscy ŚJ uważają, iż jest to wymóg religijny?
Journal of Medical Ethics 2000;26:299-301. W tym wydaniu magazynu "Lee Elder"1, występujący pod pseudonimem opozycjonista Świadków Jehowy (ŚJ), wcześniej starszy tej wiary i ciągle ŚJ, przyłącza się do niestrudzonego dr Muramoto2 5 (ten drugi nie jest ŚJ) w dostarczaniu argumentów, że nawet ich własne przekonania religijne oparte na pismach biblijnych nie wymagają od ŚJ odmawiania potencjalnie ratujących życie transfuzji krwi. "Urzędując" jeszcze w hierarchii ŚJ zgodził się z tym, że biblijne wersety nie zakazują transfuzji czy wstrzykiwania frakcji krwi, w związku z czym logicznie rzecz biorąc teologia ŚJ może i powinna dopuszczać transfuzję krwi pełnej gdy przemawiają za tym przesłanki medyczne. Niektórzy lekarze dowodzą, że powinni przekraczać właściwe autonomii decyzje Świadków Jehowy odmawiających transfuzji krwi, nawet jeśli istnieje prawdopodobieństwo zgonu w wyniku takich przetoczeń. Jednakże istnieją przypadki, które wymagają od lekarzy zapytania takich pacjentów co sądzą o ewentualnych fatalnych skutkach odmowy krwi i poświęcenia tym pacjentom uwagi, by przekonać się czy wiara członka nie dopuszcza czasem w jego przekonaniach wyrażenia zgody na potencjalnie ratującą życie transfuzję krwi. Co jest tego powodem? Otóż po prostu fakt, że najważniejszym obowiązkiem profesjonalnych lekarzy są starania o to, by pacjent odniósł korzyści zdrowotne gdy pociąga to za sobą próby ratowania jego życia i jeśli takie postępowanie będzie korzystne dla zdrowia pacjenta. Oczywiście nie jest to jakimś absolutnym obowiązkiem Jaki jest ten przypadek? Po prostu, że najważniejszy profesjonalny obowiązek doktorów, by spróbować przynieść korzyść zdrowie ich pacjentów powoduje próbowanie uratować życia ich pacjentów kiedy i, jeśli robienie tak przyniosą korzyść zdrowie ich pacjentów. Oczywiście to nie jest absolutne cło przekraczające wszystkie inne cła; szczególnie , jeśli pacjenci, którzy są właściwie autonomiczni, by tak odmówić takich doktorów leczenia lifeprolonging muszą ogólnie przyjąć taką odmowę, jednakże ze smutkiem. To redaktorskie popiera ten widok w przypadku właściwie autonomicznego prawnie kompetentnego JWs. (W innym papierze w tym zagadnieniu Profesora rejestru Shimon Glick argumentuje, że komitety etyki powinny zostać upoważniony — ponieważ oni teraz są w Izraelu — przekroczyć nawet kompetentne odmowy przedłużenia życia leczenia, gdzie sędziowie komitetu, że leczenie jest "wyraźnie korzystne" i przewiduje, że "jeśli leczenie będzie narzucone pacjent później da jego zgodę do wielokrotnego użycia".6) acceptance of potentially life-saving
blood transfusions. What is that case? Simply that doctors' primary professional
duty to try to benefit the health of their patients entails trying to save their
patients' lives when and if doing so will benefit their patients' health. Of
course this is not an absolute duty overriding all other duties; in particular
if patients who are adequately autonomous to do so refuse such lifeprolonging
treatment doctors must generally accept such refusal, however sadly. This
editorial endorses that view in the case of adequately autonomous legally
competent JWs. (In another paper in this issue of the journal Professor Shimon
Glick argues that ethics committees should be empowered—as they now are in
Israel—to override even competent refusals of life-prolonging treatment
where the committee judges that the treatment would be "clearly beneficial"
and predicts that "if the treatment is imposed the patient will later give
his consent retroactively".6) But even to argue that doctors should question a patient's religious beliefs,
let alone make suggestions that the patient should consider a contrary belief,
no matter that the contrary belief comes from within the patient's own religion,
is bound to raise hackles. Objections will be raised that these proposals are no
proper part of a doctor's business; that they are perniciously paternalistic and
coercive; that even when not carried out in an apparently coercive manner the
power imbalance between doctor and patient will ensure that in practice their
effect will often be, or at least be perceived, to be coercive, and
disrespectful of the patient's autonomy. Furthermore, their implementation would
be offensive, and would cause unnecessary additional distress for patients who
already are likely to be exceedingly distressed at the possibility of having to
die in order to meet their religious obligations. In addition, the proposals may
be seen as both morally and legally unjust by threatening to override the
patient's human and legal rights. Do these counterarguments succeed? First, is it any business of doctors even to begin to involve themselves with
their patients' religious beliefs? Normally the answer is probably no. But where
such beliefs are likely to impair a patient's health then it seems reasonable
for doctors at least to be concerned with and about those religious beliefs. As
the synoptic argument given above in favour of such concern indicates, trying to
provide benefits for their patients' health is the primary professional duty of
doctors and all obstructions to such health benefits are of prima facie concern
to doctors. What about the claim of pernicious paternalism? The rebuttal is straightforward.
Paternalism is only a relevant concept in this context if, in the absence of an
emergency precluding such attempts, the doctor does not try to discover the
autonomous preferences of an adequately autonomous person, or else overrides or
ignores those preferences, in order to provide a benefit to that person. In
other words paternalism is involved only when the doctor treats the patient in
the way a parent would treat his or her child for the child's benefit but either
without knowing the child's thought-out view of the matter or else in
contravention of that view. So while it would be paternalistic to give a blood
transfusion to a Jehovah's Witness against his or her decision to reject a blood
transfusion, and while it would be paternalistic not to try to find out if he or
she accepted or rejected a blood transfusion, it would not be
paternalistic to ask such patients their reasons for rejecting blood
transfusions, nor to ask them to consider opposing views. Would this be coercive or disrespectful of the patient's autonomy? It would
depend on how it was done. There can be little doubt that questions can be asked
and suggestions made in ways that are coercive and/or legitimately perceived as
coercive, and little doubt that the likelihood of this happening is increased
the more relative power the questioner and suggestion-maker has over his or her
interlocutor. And doctors do have massive relative power over their patients in
many circumstances, especially when the patient is very sick. But it is
perfectly possible to ask questions and make suggestions and requests, even to
very sick patients, let alone to those who are not very sick, without either
being coercive or being perceived as coercive—just by being ordinarily and
sensitively concerned for one's patient and his or her views as well as about
his or her health. Would such inquiries and suggestions be offensive and cause harm and distress to
patients who may already be distressed at the prospect of possibly having to die
for their religious beliefs? While again it would depend in part on how it was
done, none the less almost certainly some JW patients, as well as some of their
family members and co-religionists would be offended and distressed no matter
how tactful and sensitive the doctor was. Others on the other hand might well be
pleased to discuss and explain their own perspective and to read the dissident
JW views on the matter, even if they were in no measure inclined to change their
minds. And when considering potential harm to patients it is important to
consider all the potential harms and benefits involved—including in
these cases the potential harm of dying unwillingly and unnecessarily and the
potential benefit of realising that not all one's co-religionists believe that
one is religiously obliged to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion. Here it may be helpful to recall other potentially offensive or otherwise
upsetting proposals that doctors may none the less feel professionally obliged
to make in the interests of trying to preserve and or benefit their patients'
health. Think for example of offering to discuss the implications of unpleasant
diagnoses with patients; or of proposing peculiarly upsetting operations such as
mastectomies, colostomies or limb amputations; doctors will know that some
patients are going to reject such proposals and that for those patients the very
suggestions will prove to be excessively unpleasant, upsetting and sometimes
offensive, and with little or no compensating benefit. Even simple explanations
about the unhealthy effects of certain lifestyles can be offensive and/or
upsetting to some patients—none the less doctors will often consider it
their duty to offer such explanations, (at least once!) in the interests of
trying to benefit their patients' health, despite knowing that they may offend
and/or possibly distress some patients by doing so. Even if not coercive or offensive will patients' autonomy be somehow overridden
if doctors ask JW patients if they would be prepared to give their reasons for
rejecting life-saving blood transfusions and to consider dissident JW views that
accept blood transfusions? Surely not, provided of course that such requests are
genuine requests—as distinct from some form of "doctor's orders"—made
in ways that are intended to respect the patient and his or her autonomy, and
that the answer "no" is accepted as such, however painful it may be
for a doctor to accede to such a refusal and to have to employ alternative
techniques that he or she considers unlikely to save the patient's life. Given
such qualifications it is not disrespectful of such patients' autonomy to ask
them if they would explain the reasons for their refusal and to ask them if they
would read alternative explanations from their co-religionists that might enable
them to save their lives while honouring their religious commitments. It is also
true, as professor Glick points out,6 that respect for autonomy is
only one of several potentially relevant but potentially conflicting moral
concerns and that there is no automatic reason to assume that it must "trump"
the others—but as stated above, this editorial argues that in these cases
the competent JW's refusal of treatment should trump the other moral concerns
and be respected—however tragic the outcome. Here it might be counterargued that religion is often not based on reason but on
faith, belief and spiritual values and that it is simply mistaken—as well
as damaging and disrespectful to what might be termed religious autonomy—to
attempt to use reason to undermine them. While this may often be true, it is
clear that the JW belief that blood transfusions are forbidden by God does
purport to be based on reasoning, notably the explicit claim that Biblical
scriptures prohibit it—and both Mr Malyon and Mr Ridley, on behalf of the
main body of JWs, make this clear.7 9 Since such a claim explicitly
appeals to reason it is entirely legitimate to point out, as "Lee Elder"
and Dr Muramoto do point out 1-5 that blood transfusion has nothing
to do with "eating" or "ingestion" of blood (which is what
the relevant scriptures forbid) and that acceptance by the main body of JWs of
medical injection and transfusion of blood fractions confirms this point. It is
also worth pointing out, as Dr Savulsecu and Professor Momeyer point out,10
that the vast majority of Christians worldwide reject the antitransfusion
interpretation of biblical scriptures; and that the Christian practice of Holy
Communion is based on biblical scriptures in which, far from forbidding the
eating or ingestion of blood, Christ explicitly tells his disciples to drink his
blood, at least as symbolised in the communion wine and for those who believe in
the doctrine of transubstantiation, as actualised in the communion wine. Finally, what about the claim that it would be against justice for doctors to
ask their JW patients if they would explain why they rejected blood transfusions
and if they would read the opposing views of some of their (admittedly dissident)
co-religionists, on the grounds that to do so would threaten the human and legal
rights of the JWs concerned? The claim is simply false. There are no human
rights requiring others to desist from asking one for explanations of one's
beliefs or from requesting that one reads views contrary to one's own—assuming
of course that "request" means request and is not a covert term
for coercion of some sort—ie provided that one is not obliged to meet such
requests. Nor, it is worth explicitly stating, are the proposals in this
editorial based on distributive justice arguments which point out that
the alternative non-blood treatments required by JWs are unjust because they
cost much more than blood and therefore create unnecessary opportunity costs for
others. Why the anonymity of "Lee Elder"? Despite Mr Malyon's and Mr Ridley's
and other official JW claims to the contrary it seems to this writer probable
that Jehovah's Witnesses who go against the "official line" forbidding
blood transfusions risk major sanctions from their church, including highly
oppressive rejection by erstwhile friends, coreligionists and worst of all, even
by family members, such rejection apparently sanctioned and sometimes encouraged
by JW authorities. There are simply too many examples cited by Dr Muramoto and
"Lee Elder" and on the web sites cited by them, as well as in the
cases and in the web sites cited by Mr Hart in his article in The Big Issue,11
for official denials to be plausible. To help protect "Lee Elder"
against such risks the editor of this journal decided that it was justifiable to
withhold his proper name and instead use the pseudonym. In
summary, this editorial makes the fairly modest proposal that doctors would
at least be professionally justified—and some might consider that they
were professionally obliged—to ask their Jehovah's Witness patients if
they would explain why they rejected potentially life-saving blood transfusions,
and to ask them if they would read arguments from members of their own religion—of
course currently dissident members—justifying their acceptance of blood
from within the belief system of that religion. The editorial considers and
rejects counterarguments to these modest proposals. Henceforth the writer
intends to act accordingly and to have available in his medical office
photocopies at least of "Lee Elder"'s paper in this issue1
which he will invite his Jehovah's Witness patients to read. Other doctors may
wish to consider doing something similar. One final point, ad homines. Jehovah's Witnesses themselves should
respect the virtues of these proposed actions, which involve asking people to
explain their religious beliefs, asking them to listen to counterarguments, and
asking them to read articles promoting alternative religious viewpoints. As a
group, JWs are among the most ardent exponents of such an approach, especially
on Sunday mornings when they knock at the doors of perfect strangers and ask
permission to reason with them, and offer them literature, as part of their
endeavour to help these strangers save their immortal souls. Thus of all people
JWs should themselves be the last to find it offensive or immoral if their
doctors risk offending them when they return the compliment in an effort to save
their mortal bodies. It remains possible for all parties to decline either form
of attempted salvation.
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